War and Trade are two human activities that are so intrinsic to the species that it is impossible to assign any moment in its evolution at which either of them first "appeared". Every stage of socio-political evolution, from hunting and gathering to agriculture and animal husbandry and on to the commercial and industrial nations of today, has seen people conducting trade and warfare, both within their own boundaries and across them. The object of both Trade and War, or "Warre" as Thomas Hobbes more emphatically labeled it, has for most of the time been access to and control over scarce "Natural Resources", differing only in the means by which this is to be achieved. Trade attempts to secure access to the fruits of the natural resources possessed by others by offering something of value in return, frequently the products obtained from the different bundle of natural resources in one's own possession, thereby making both parties "better off". War, on the other hand, attempts to do this by using force to deprive the other of the resources at his command, without offering anything of value in return. The use of force, however, itself requires the input of the user's own scarce resources. Thus both War and Trade, from this perspective, are but alternative options to convert one's own scarce resources into those of the other in a manner that enhances one's own welfare, the difference being that Trade also raises the welfare of the other while War reduces it. Which option will be taken, at any given moment, and to what extent, will of course depend upon the circumstances and the preferences of the agents with regard to the benefits, costs and risks involved.
Lionel Robbins famously defined economics as the study of the relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses. This places the rational use of force squarely within the discipline, so that in principle economics should have just as much to say about War as it does about Trade. As we all know, however, the contributions of economists on trade vastly exceed anything they have ever said about war, with Adam Smith's brilliant opening passages "Of the Expence of Defence" to Book V of the Wealth of Nations being a notable exception. Also worthy of note in this regard is the brief but suggestive formal discussion of international relations by Trygve Haavelmo (1954, p.91-98) in which he makes the point that a country may choose to use some of its resources for "unproductive" or "predatory" purposes, to acquire goods by "grabbing" from others, requiring the others to in turn use their own resources "unproductively" in order to deter the aggressor, thus leading to an all-round reduction in global output.
While students of trade may have had little to say about war, students of war have generally recognized that competition over scarce resources, particularly natural resources, has been the underlying cause of war from the emergence of humanity itself to the present day. This point of view has recently been made most forcefully and impressively by Azar Gat (2006) in a remarkable work on War in Human Civilization, that begins with fighting and aggression in the animal kingdom as the evolutionary prelude to human conflict from the Paleolithic to the present. We find it interesting that Gat's history of war has had to deal with production and trade almost to the same extent as we have had to deal with war in our own contemporaneous book, Findlay and O'Rourke (2007) Tilly (1990) 
on Coercion, Capital and European
States AD . Clearly these two seemingly contradictory aspects of humanity, conflict in the one case and cooperation in the other, are inextricably intertwined throughout the entire course of history.
Given such a vast field to cover, what can we hope to usefully say in the space of a single chapter? Since any attempt to be comprehensive must obviously come at the 3 price of superficiality we choose to focus on putting forward sketches of two related analytical models that one of us has developed earlier in Findlay (1996) on "Territorial Expansion and the Limits of Empire", and Findlay and Amin (2008) on "National Security and International Trade: A Simple General Equilibrium Model", and applying them to some particular historical episodes. The "empire" model is first applied to three major empires across a wide span of time, the Romans, the Mongols and the European maritime empires that emerged after the fifteenth century European voyages of discovery.
The "National Security and International Trade" model is then applied to the case of the "Global Cold War" between the United States and the Soviet Union, and then to the contemporary geopolitical scene in the final section. The objective is not to try to say anything substantively new about any of these momentous historical events, but to hopefully demonstrate that economic theory and history can usefully be applied to the unified treatment of war, trade and natural resources in relation to them.
The Expansion of Empires
The life cycle of empires can usefully be divided into three phases. These are (1) an initial expansionary phase in which the future imperial power exploits some "edge" that it has acquired in military technology or organization over surrounding peoples or states, bringing them under its dominion as either clients or subservient allies or directly incorporating and administering their territory; (2) a second phase of consolidation of the rule over the acquired lands and subject peoples in the "high" empire; and (3) a third phase of contraction, decline and fall under pressure either from resistance and rebellion of the subject peoples themselves or attacks from external forces and powers, combined with loss of internal cohesion and control. We will here be concerned almost entirely with the first of these phases, although some remarks will be made about the second and third. The "natural resource" that is involved in relation to empires will not so much be particular types of resources but rather the generic natural resource of "land", which can encompass all particular varieties from agriculture to forestry and mining.
From an economic point of view the concept of empire unifies the theme of the relationships between war, trade and natural resources in a historically very important way. Each successful empire seeks to maximize its defensible territorial extent by first 4 waging war, but then it has an enduring interest in maintaining peace across this domain to promote economic activity, trade and the exploitation of natural resources in order to provide the revenues necessary to maintain its armed forces and administrative services and promote the welfare of its elite members, as well as its ordinary citizens to whatever extent possible. Empires therefore always strive to maintain a peace or Pax within their own borders, while warily protecting them from rival empires, states or wandering marauders. Thus our history of the last thousand years of world trade in Power and Plenty is largely concerned with the struggles of empires to establish and maintain themselves while fostering trade within and also across their borders. On the other hand, the wars provoked by these very same attempts to create and preserve empires have often been the main causes of the disruptions of world trade throughout history, but particularly in the past century.
We begin with the presentation of a simple formal model of "territorial expansion and the limits of empire" based on Findlay (1996) , but extended in an important direction. The next three sections are brief discussions of three major historical examples, the Roman Empire of antiquity, the Mongol Empire of the middle ages and the Western European empires of the early modern era, considered in their collective aspect in relation to the rest of the world, rather than singly in relation to each of the nation-states involved.
Each of these examples will be examined in relation to the model to see how it "fits" each case, however loosely or broadly. The literature on each of these historical cases, as well as of the comparative study of empires, is of course incredibly vast and there will be no futile attempt at comprehensiveness, though all relevant sources on which we have drawn for particular insights or evidence will be mentioned. The subject of empire has been given a fresh lease of life as a consequence of the events of September 11 th , 2001, so it will be difficult not to make some observations on the historical experience of empires in relation to contemporary issues, following the example of Chua (2007), which is only the most recent of several notable attempts in this regard.
A Model of Empire
Imagine a tribe of people, numbering N, concentrated at a point on a "featureless plain", so beloved by location theorists. They are surrounded by peoples of other tribes, 5 whom they regard as "barbarians"
, not yet having acquired the necessary degree of political correctness. In order to acquire and maintain surrounding territory for cultivation they need to devote some manpower to forming an army, with the radius of the circular domain that they can hold being an increasing function of the size of the army, but at a diminishing rate. More formally there is a function r (A), where r is the radius and A the size of the army, with the first derivative positive and the second negative to indicate diminishing returns to military expansion. For a given value of A the length of the radius of control r depends on the relative efficiency of the tribe's army compared to the forces of the barbarians by which they are surrounded. Any land acquired must be protected and held and thus A has to be thought of as a permanent stationary flow rather than a onetime commitment of armed force. For any A and hence r (A) the resulting area of the circular territory under the tribe's control would be given by the familiar formula of "pi r squared". The resulting area or territory T can yield output Q given by the production
, the number of citizens not enlisted in the army.
We can think of land and labor as being substitutable for each other for the production of output, so that we can deploy the familiar textbook device of an "isoquant map" to illustrate the production function. The marginal products of land and labor are both positive but diminishing, while more of either factor increases the marginal productivity of the other.
Consider the problem of how the tribe should divide its manpower N between A and L. Devoting all N to A would maximize the territory T that the tribe can clear and hold but would leave no labor L to produce Q. No army at all would maximize L but Q would again be zero in the absence of any T. We can describe the problem for the tribe to be to maximize Q, subject to the production function F(T, L), the "military range" function r(A) and the manpower constraint A+L = N. A simple graphical solution of this problem is to construct a "factor transformation curve" showing how increasing A from zero to N yields increasing areas of T from zero to the maximum attainable at r(A) = r(N) (see Figure 1 ). This curve would be concave to the origin, i.e. display diminishing returns because the second derivative of r (A) is assumed negative due to lengthening supply lines and other difficulties of being further away from the base at the center.
Superimposing the isoquant map onto this factor transformation curve determines the 6 highest attainable output Q* by the point of tangency between the factor transformation curve and the isoquant corresponding to Q*. The coordinates of this tangency point also yield the optimal values for the size of the army A* and hence the civilian labor force [N-
A*], and the territorial extent T*. In the usual economic jargon this tangency point equates the marginal rate of substitution between land and labor in the production of output to the marginal rate of transformation between land and labor determined by allocating labor to the acquisition of land by mobilization in the ranks of the army.
The underlying logic of this "first order condition" is however intuitively clear and can be very simply explained and understood. As with the ancient Romans a man can serve as either farmer or soldier or even both at different times of the year since the campaign seasons were determined largely by weather conditions. The opportunity cost of placing a man in the legions would be what he could produce as a farmer, his marginal product on the land. The gain of making him a legionary would be the additional land that could be acquired as a result, multiplied by the extra output that this additional land could produce in conjunction with the residual labor force engaged in farming. Thus the necessary condition for the optimal size of army A*, output Q* and territorial extent of the "empire" T* is that the marginal product of the additional land acquired by the Roman as legionary be equal to the marginal product of that same Roman as farmer.
This solution to the problem of the optimal extent of the empire assumes that the inhabitants of the conquered territories are killed or expelled, and that only the land is acquired to be worked by the empire's own original citizens. One obvious extension of the model would be for the empire to use the conquered people as slaves or Spartan-type helots, thus augmenting the non-military labor force at the disposal of the empire. Each possibility could be worked out but the most interesting is to have the empire attach the conquered peoples to itself not just as allies or client states, like the Athenians or Romans did earlier in their history, but to go all the way and extend full citizenship to all who would accept it, as the Romans did in the later phases of their empire. Thus the army not only extends the territory of the empire but augments its labor force as well, for both civilian and military employment. The simplest way to extend the model to take this important modification into account is to assume that additional labor is acquired in proportion to the additional land as the size of the army is increased. The fact that there is diminishing returns to land acquisition, while labor acquisition is proportional to land, ensures that there is an upper bound to the optimal size of empire in this extended case. It is easy to prove that such an "inclusive" empire, other things being equal, would not just have more population and labor but greater territorial extent as well. To establish this point consider the solution already obtained in the absence of labor acquisition. With additional labor per unit of land denoted by "n" the total additional labor acquired from land T* would be nT*. If all this labor were to work the land the marginal product of each farm worker would fall and the marginal product of land would rise. Thus the opportunity cost of an extra legionary would fall while his marginal product in the army would rise since the extra land he acquires would be more productive as the result of the larger civilian labor force. The army should therefore be enlarged, until the first order condition is restored, resulting in a more expansive territory over which the empire extends its sway. In the opinion of many historians of antiquity their willingness to grant citizenship to subject peoples was why Rome was able to acquire and maintain such a large empire for so long, while the Greek city-states' jealously guarded exclusivity in this respect prevented them from ever gaining and holding any wide swath of territory under their dominion for any length of time.
Simple as it is, our model is able to give analytical precision to some important ideas in the literature on empire. One is the concept of the "military participation ratio" or MPR introduced by the sociologist Stanislav Andreski (1968) to denote the extent of the allocation of the labor force to military activities. In our model this is defined as A/N.
This ratio is taken as a given for each society by Andreski but we are able to derive it endogenously as A*/N* in our model with both the size of the army A* and the population N* itself determined by the model as functions of the civilian and military
technologies.
An even more important concept is the idea of "imperial overstretch" introduced by Paul Kennedy (1987) . Thus, suppose that like Alexander or Napoleon the leader of our imperial polity is seduced by the desire to conquer land for the sake of "glory" rather than merely for the economic benefit that it provides. He would expand the army beyond A*, acquiring more land than T* and more people than N* to satisfy his thirst for glory, but would have to pay the price of a lower Q* for this indulgence in satisfying Power at the 8 expense of Plenty. The military budget as a proportion of total output wA/Q, where w is the real wage of a soldier equal to the marginal product of labor, would be higher, as well as A itself, while Q would be lower, all relative to the optimal solution, meaning that the ratio of tax or tribute to output would also have to be higher than under the optimal solution. This means that the empire would be less able to sustain the fiscal burden of defense against external attack or internal dissension, accelerating the prospect of the empire's decline and fall.
The idea of the function r (A) and its properties used here is inspired by the concept of a society's "military range", or the area over which its armed forces can exercise effective striking power, introduced into a brief review of a comparative study of feudalism by Owen Lattimore (1957) . He compares the military range with the "administrative range", the area over which the society can exercise direct centralized control. He suggests that feudalism arises when the former range exceeds the latter, i.e.
the center finds it more convenient to cede local administration to the vassal or client entity, while at the same time being able to enforce its claims for tribute and so on by exerting force to ensure compliance when necessary. In the context of empire this suggests two concentric circles, with the center imposing direct administration only over the inner circle, while permitting devolution of authority in the area between the circles.
The distance between the circles represents the area over which the benefits of direct rule to the center are exceeded at the margin by the additional costs. This same image can be found, quite independently of Lattimore, in Figure 1 .2 of the well-known book on the Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire by Edward Luttwak (1976) . His "hegemonic empire" has three concentric circles, the first being the "zone of direct control", the second an "inner zone of diplomatic control" over client states, and the third an "outer zone of influence over client tribes". His "territorial empire", on the other hand, has only one circle, representing the "totality of empire under direct rule", with all client states annexed and client tribes absorbed into the imperial polity. This is therefore a convenient point at which to consider the application of our model to this most famous of all empires, the Roman. Grant (1978, p.57) , but Rosenstein (1999) says the free population was only about 350,000 with an area of 5,500 square kilometers. Next came the protracted conflict known as the Second or Great Samnite War from 327-302BC, which was provoked by the Romans by intrusions into the Samnite sphere of influence, followed by a Third from 298-290BC. Raaflaub (1996, p.277) dates the beginning of Roman "imperialism" proper from these wars against the Samnites, since the defeated powers were not absorbed into the victorious polity but dominated by it. Rosenstein Mediterranean basin according to Rosenstein (1999, p.196) . The Mediterranean for the Romans had truly become mare nostrum, "our sea", and all the trade relations conducted across it would be under their aegis for centuries to come.
The Roman Empire
How and why was the small city-state on the Tiber able to so successfully launch such a sustained expansion? Earlier historians of Rome paradoxically maintained that all
Rome's wars were defensive in origin, a view that was vigorously disputed and effectively overthrown by William Harris (1979) . In this and subsequent works by many 10 other scholars emphasis is laid on the manner in which the Roman social structure and political institutions channeled the ambitions of its elite citizens into intense competition for political office and military command to satisfy their thirst for gloria and dignitas, not to speak of the riches and booty that successful campaigns could bring. Conquered land could also be distributed to the class of smallholders that provided the bulk of the legions.
As Rosenstein (1999, p.200) observes, "war at Rome became the nexus linking the interests of rich and poor, Roman and ally, patrician and wealthy plebian, junior senator and distinguished ex-consul", thus preserving the social equilibrium of the state. Service in the army and its continued success also played an important part in linking the separate classes together in a common Roman identity. It is this structural feature of the Roman socio-political system, rather than the notion that they were "born to be wolves" in keeping with their mythical origins, that scholars such as Raaflaub and Harris stress as the explanation of why they were so prone to war as an almost endogenous feature of their society. The highest offices were the two consuls elected every year for one-year non-renewable terms, which meant that war came to be sought almost annually for each incumbent to gain his opportunity for the glory of a triumph. The ability of this pattern to be maintained presumed that these wars would be both successful and lucrative, not only for the consuls but also for the lesser office-holders and ultimately the citizen-soldiers themselves. It is to answer the question of why this was so that we have to consider the unique military tactics and organization that were developed by the Romans.
The Roman legion, their basic military unit, was derived from the hoplite phalanx that the Greek city-states invented in their wars against each other. The hoplite (bearer of a hoplon or shield) was an armored infantryman carrying a thrusting spear in his right hand while covering his left side and his neighbor's right with a large oval shield, while standing in one of the ranks of a rectangular formation known as the phalanx. The phalanx moved and fought as a single unit, so that each man had to trust that his comrades would not break ranks. Group solidarity was thus essential and was provided by the fact that the soldiers were generally all farmers from the same locality, fighting in the off-season from agricultural labor. The discipline and fortitude of the hoplite phalanx was tested again and again in the conflicts between the Greek city-states and in their battles against foreign enemies. The Spartans in their heroic stand against the Persians 11 while vastly outnumbered at Thermopylae exemplified this type of warfare at its best.
Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander in the second half of the fourth century created the Macedonian phalanx, with more offensive power using longer spears and cutting down on the cumbersome defensive armor and large shields of the classical phalanx.
They also worked out effective coordination between the heavy infantry of the phalanx and supporting armored heavy cavalry, as well as making innovations in logistics and other aspects of military science.
The Romans benefited from all of these developments in the art of war but The cost of this military establishment of the empire is estimated at between 40-50% of total revenue. Public administration was sufficiently light for Garnsey and Saller (1987, ch. 2) to describe it as "government without bureaucracy", the secret of which was a system of self-governing cities and relatively autonomous provinces. In effect the power of Roman arms and the seductiveness of the Graeco-Roman culture effectively coopted local elites, from Gaul, Spain and Britain to Syria, Palestine and Egypt, to the 14 service of the empire without the necessity to expend resources to control them. The army itself with its extensive network of military colonies and settlements was a major agent of Romanization. The liberal grant of citizenship made for "careers open to talents" and eventually the Senate and the emperors themselves were drawn increasingly from both the western and eastern provinces. The Romans clearly regarded themselves as a superior people but they seem to have been free of racial or religious prejudice.
Persecution of the Jews and Christians was due to their difficulties with the acceptance of the symbols of Roman authority, rather than to any objection to their religious practices.
This did not prevent the Romans from suppressing the Jewish revolts with savage brutality and liberally accommodating the early Christian desire for martyrdom.
While the problem of "decline and fall" is beyond the scope of this paper a few words might nevertheless be in order. One trend was the fact that recruits increasingly tended to come from the provinces rather than Italy itself, leading perhaps to some loss of loyalty to the empire on the average. Another military trend was the wholesale adoption of barbarian tribes into the army as independent units under their own leaders, an obviously dangerous procedure. Romanization of the Germanic tribes also made them more formidable adversaries. In terms of our model r (A) shrank for any given value of A, leading to a loss of relative if not absolute military efficiency, requiring either a loss of security or an increase in cost and hence taxation. Thus our model, limited though it is, can perhaps contribute something to the "triumph of barbarism" explanation for the decline and fall, if not to that of Christianity.
The Mongol Empire
Remarkable as was the speed and extent of the expansion of the Roman Empire it was substantially exceeded by that of the Mongol Empire under Genghis Khan and his successors in the thirteenth century. Application of our model to this most fascinating of all cases of imperial expansion however requires an important extension to be made first.
The model as presented has a unique solution for the optimal size of the army because the marginal contribution of an additional soldier to output is always decreasing while the marginal cost in terms of output foregone is always increasing, giving us only one intersection for the two curves. It is entirely possible however for the marginal benefit feat are too intricate for us to recount here. Allsen (1994) , Barfield (1989 ), Biran (2007 and Ratchnevsky (1991) 
The European Maritime Empires
Up till now we have been considering the Lattimore "military range" function r 
Two World Wars and the Great Depression
The century of peace and prosperity that the world economy on the whole enjoyed States', a spearhead pointed at Japan".
The stage was thus set for a global conflict between the "Heartland" and the "Rimland", the land powers of Eurasia versus the sea powers of the Atlantic and Pacific, which had long been anticipated by the geopolitical theorists Halford Mackinder (1904) and Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890). War, trade and natural resources were once again fatefully intertwined, on a global scale.
The failure of Operation Barbarossa, and ultimately the preponderance of the "sinews of war" available to the Allied side as a result of the US economy pulling out of the Depression, enabled them to "turn(ed) their economic strength into effective fighting power" [Overy (1995, p.325 (1960), Brito and Intrilligator (1975) and others. What appears to be still missing, however, is a model that simultaneously considers defense expenditures motivated by rivalrous interaction over "national security" in a Hobbesian world, and production and trade for civilian purposes. The next section will present an outline of such a model, based upon Findlay and Amin (2008) , after which we will attempt to apply it to some of the issues raised by the "Global Cold War".
A Model of Trade and National Security
Consider two economies, each endowed with a fixed amount of two factors of production, capital and labor. The ratio of capital to labor is higher in one of them, Consumers in both countries will be as well off as they can be, given the defense expenditures in each country, with free trade resulting in the more capital-abundant "A"
exporting the capital-intensive good Y and "R" the labor-intensive good X.
As it stands this model could be used for a variety of comparative static exercises, such as the impact on defense expenditures of a transition from autarky to free trade or vice versa, evaluating the nature of the "peace dividend" in the event of partial or complete disarmament, or of economic growth in the form of factor augmentation or technical progress in any of the three goods on consumer welfare and defense levels.
Perhaps the most interesting single result is that since "national security" is not an inferior good in a Hobbesian world, any move towards trade liberalization will stimulate greater defense expenditures by each side in response to the greater consumer utility generated by the gains from trade. This is because in the optimal equilibrium situation that each country is in, the marginal utility of civilian consumption has to be equal to the marginal utility arising from the national security component of the overall welfare function, so that the fall in marginal utility of civilian consumption arising as a result of the gains from free or freer trade requires an increase in defense expenditure to reduce the marginal utility from national security for the optimal solution to be maintained.
The Global Cold War
The Global Cold War dominated all aspects of international relations in the second half of the twentieth century and we are still living with its consequences and will no doubt continue to do so for a very long time. As 
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To apply the model of the previous section to the Global Cold War we identify the capital-abundant country as the US and the labor-abundant one as the Soviet Union.
We also can let the production functions for the civilian goods X and Y be Hicksneutrally superior in America, while keeping the defense technologies initially identical.
Furthermore we can let the Soviet Union place relatively greater weight on national security as compared with civilian consumer utility in the overall welfare function.
Another modification is to introduce a third 'country', or rather "Third World", into the model as the zone over which the two superpowers compete by offering "foreign aid" as a unilateral transfer payment, denoted F, to be spent on civilian goods by the recipients. A different but not mutually exclusive hypothesis would stress the increasing technical superiority and economic efficiency of the US not in the defense sector itself but in the civilian sector, which made it possible to both increase defense expenditures to levels that were very difficult for the Soviet Union to adequately respond to, and also at the same time to deliver more foreign aid and military assistance to zones of contention in the Third World, notably Afghanistan, all the while raising per capita real incomes and private consumption at home and for its allies and clients as well through trade and foreign aid. All of this was achieved despite the oil shocks and inflation of the seventies and the recession of the early eighties. The long-sustained attempt by the Soviet Union to "overtake and surpass" its capitalist rival, the notion behind Nikita Khruschev's confident boast to John F. Kennedy that "we will bury you" in the aftermath of Sputnik, simply proved to have been an illusion, leading to Mikhail Gorbachev's withdrawal from Afghanistan and eventual capitulation. The policy of Perestroika attempted to solve the problem by pursuing economic reform but the loosening of political control whetted the dissatisfaction of the long-suffering public with the poor economic performance and the failure of living standards to rise and also undermined the functioning of the traditional economic system before it could be transformed. Thus the "Empire of Liberty" was finally able to vanquish the "Empire of Justice" by its technological superiority in both the defense and civilian spheres. As Westad (2007, p.403) , no uncritical admirer of the United States, put it "America just had more of everything: power, growth, ideas, modernity". Even one of the Soviet Union's major economic assets, its abundant oil supplies, might actually have turned out to be a net disadvantage as a result of the "Dutch Disease" arising from the oil price rises of the seventies.
Geopolitics of the Early Twenty-First Century
The end of the Cold War was not entirely an unmixed blessing. With 2% of world oil reserves and 25% of world oil consumption the US is the world's largest net importer but the rapidly growing economies of China and India are clearly also adding substantially to the upward pressure on the price of oil and other energy sources. China, in particular, has a voracious appetite not only for oil but also for iron ore, coal and other natural resource inputs of all kinds, and is scouring the world in the attempt to ensure future supplies by long-term contracts. It is clear that the scarcity of 31 oil and other essential fuel and energy sources are going to be the key to not only the economics of the twenty-first century but the geopolitics as well. Since oil supply is concentrated in the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia (and with new sources being discovered off the coast of Brazil), while demand is spread all around the world but particularly in the US, the EU and now increasingly China and India, the transportation of oil becomes a key issue in terms of not only the trade but also the national security of all the states involved on both sides of the supply-demand balance. Neither Mackinder nor Mahan (1900) , in his pamphlet on the "Problem of Asia", could have imagined that China would be the leading contender for mastery of the Eurasian landmass a mere century after they wrote, when the decrepit Manchu dynasty was on its last legs in the aftermath of the Boxer uprising, and the infamous Siege of Peking had placed the country at the mercy of the European powers and Japan. China is 32 now the leading exporter in the world, ahead of Germany and the United States with Britain a mere tenth behind not only China and Japan but Korea as well. China relies on massive imports of iron ore from Australia and Brazil, while two-thirds of its oil supply comes from the Persian Gulf. Earlier we had occasion to quote the fifteenth century Portuguese Tome Pires' statement that "the lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice". The effective 'Lord of Malacca' today is the US Navy, a geopolitical fact that is undoubtedly not unknown to the CCP leadership. Chinese warships are now sailing in the Indian Ocean for the first time since Zheng He in the fifteenth century. As we noted earlier, national security is a "normal good" with an income-elasticity of demand probably much greater than unity, so we can confidently expect defense expenditures in China to rise even faster than the double-digit growth of GDP. Moreover, it would make little sense for China to attempt to match the US Navy simply by building aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and guided missile cruisers. Instead a strategy of "leapfrogging" on to space-based weaponry would seem to be the better bet. Russia meanwhile still has an enormous nuclear arsenal but its more potent weapon is its control over the energy supplies from itself and Central Asia to the EU, the pipelines replacing
Mackinder's railways as the key indicator of geopolitical influence.
The world will undoubtedly continue to see relatively low-intensity, asymmetrical warfare of the "Tomahawk vs. Kalashnikov" type as Michael Howard (2002) describes it and as the US is now waging in Afghanistan against the Taliban. The main threats of war involving states come from Iran and North Korea and their nuclear ambitions and intentions. Here one hopes that both China and Russia have an interest in the continuation of the globalization that has proved so beneficial to both of them and that this will trump any desire to stick a thumb in the eye of the United States, tempting though that might be, and lead them to assist in resolving issues peacefully. Meanwhile the stalemates over Palestine and Kashmir continue with no apparent end in sight, waiting for something to set these time-bombs off.
World trade shrank by over 20% in 2008-9 as a result of the financial crisis.
While deplorable and dangerous, the crisis may also be salutary if taken as a warning sign that the endless expansion of world trade is not guaranteed, and that the strengthening of 33 financial regulations and other improvements in the economic and geopolitical framework within which it is conducted are necessary and long overdue.
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